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Introduction
National identity—the sense of one’s belonging to the 
nation and the extent to which people believe being a mem-
ber of the nation is important—is a key aspect or core 
dimension of social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Huddy and 
Khatib, 2007; Theiss-Morse, 2009).1 One advantage of the 
social identity approach is that it organizes research in a 
more consistent theoretical framework, potentially solving 
problems of conceptual confusion (Schildkraut, 2014). For 
example, scholars can consider how citizens’ relationships 
with their nation overlap with their political views, as 
Huddy and Khatib (2007) did using multiple samples from 
the 1990s and early 2000s. They find that Americans’ sense 
of belonging to their nation is orthogonal to political ide-
ologies and partisanship. Nonetheless, some potentially 
related attitudes—uncritical loyalty and desire for positive 
change—appear more politically charged in the American 
student samples of the early 2000s, with ideological con-
servatives more supportive of the former and less so for the 
latter. Thus Huddy and Khatib (2007) find that whereas 
national identity is not politicized, proscriptive attitudes 
about how to behave, potentially are. As with any social 
science analysis, it is worth examining how well these con-
clusions apply at different periods of time and/or with dif-
ferent populations. In the decade since Huddy and Khatib’s 
article, polarization has increased, as has the success of 
populist leaders and parties across western democracies. 
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One common refrain from these political opportunists is 
“taking our country back,” raising the possibility that 
national identity has become (more) politicized. In this 
paper, we revisit these questions about the politicization of 
national identity and ask whether the political ground 
underneath the analyses of Huddy and Khatib has shifted to 
such a degree that we need to update our conclusions about 
the relationship between national identity and ideology.
In this paper, we follow the path laid out by Huddy and 
Khatib and draw on social identity theory to argue that 
national identity might be apolitical in certain contexts, 
but not in others. Importantly, we view the analyses here 
as fully compatible with Huddy and Khatib (2007). Their 
work inspired us to examine these questions at a different 
point in time and across multiple populations, and the 
continuity is evident in following their emphasis on the 
importance of social identity to understanding how citi-
zens feel and think about their nation. Although the results 
presented here differ in some ways from those presented 
by Huddy and Khatib, the broader theoretical approach is 
taken directly from them. We hope the results we present 
here offer enough richness to deepen our understanding of 
how political context may be important to consider when 
thinking about the relationship between ideology/parti-
sanship and national attachment. More generally, we think 
that the existence of both change and continuity in the 
structure of attitudes about national identity (and related 
constructs) is perfectly consistent with the social identity 
approach. When political elites differ in emphasizing a 
strong sense of national attachment as a constitutive group 
norm, so will reported national identity levels at the citi-
zen level.
We measure national identity, uncritical loyalty and the 
desire for positive changes in national surveys of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Using latent varia-
ble modeling we first establish the cross-cultural equiva-
lence of these three constructs, and then test the hypothesis 
that ideologues and partisans on the left and right alike con-
tinue to embrace national identity, while also continuing to 
differ in proscriptive attitudes about behavior. In all three 
countries, we find partisanship and ideology to color not 
only the normative dimensions of uncritical loyalty and the 
desire for positive change but also the previously apolitical 
dimension of national identity. We must again emphasize 
that this is not a corrective of Huddy and Khatib (2007), but 
an extension. Our survey data come from political contexts 
that differ markedly from those analyzed in Huddy and 
Khatib (2007); as such, our findings do not undermine their 
work, but rather build on it.
National identity, normative content, 
and political attitudes
Research on citizens’ relationships with their nation pro-
duces many concepts and measures (for a recent review, see 
Schildkraut, 2014), and a comprehensive analysis of them 
all is infeasible. Instead, we concentrate on the subset of 
concepts that Huddy and Khatib (2007: 75) advise:
•• a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the 
nation;
•• the degree to which people exhibit an uncritical loy-
alty that combines “unquestioning positive evalua-
tion, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” 
(Schatz et al., 1999: 153); and
•• the degree to which citizens are “driven by a desire 
for positive change” (Schatz et al., 1999: 153; see 
also Staub, 1997; Rothì et al., 2005).
National identity/attachment
The concept of national identity derives directly from the 
more general social psychological theory of social identity 
(Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988), 
which defines social identity “as an awareness of one’s 
objective membership in the group and a psychological 
sense of group attachment” (Huddy and Khatib, 2007: 65). 
Accordingly, the term “national identity” denotes a sense of 
attachment, or belonging to the nation.
Are political attitudes—like ideology—related to 
national attachment? Following the social identity 
approach, a key to understanding this relationship is that 
group members internalize constitutive in-group norms, 
world views, and attitudes (Turner et al., 1987; Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Accordingly, 
people cognitively represent social groups as category pro-
totypes. These group prototypes not only describe constitu-
tive group attributes but also prescribe how members 
should think and act. Crucially for us, national attachment 
might constitute a prototypical characteristic of a given par-
tisan or ideological camp. To learn about the group proto-
type members, one must look to other, important members. 
As Hogg and Smith (2007: 98) put it, “the construction and 
identification of norms is, therefore, a dynamic process in 
which the social context plays a significant role.” This 
means that as the dominant elite political discourse linking 
party or ideology to national identity changes, so will the 
relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national 
identity. At one point in time and place, a strong feeling of 
national attachment might be advocated as a constitutive 
in-group norm within a party or ideological camp; at 
another point in time and place it might not. Thus, in line 
with Huddy and Khatib (2007) we do not believe there is a 
reflexive or knee-jerk psychological link between national 
attachment and political views, given that national attach-
ment is (potentially) free of normative content and there-
fore reconcilable with different political ideologies. 
However, differences in the degree to which political elites 
from different camps stress a strong sense of national 
attachment as a constitutive norm of their group may result 
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in a correlation between political loyalties and national 
identity levels at the citizen level.2
Following this theoretical argument, Huddy and Khatib’s 
findings should be interpreted as a function of collecting 
data in the United States in the wake of Western triumph 
over communism, as found in the 1996 General Social 
Survey (GSS, 1996) and in the national unity following the 
events of 11 September 2001 (2002 and 2004 New York 
student samples, collected less than 60 miles from the 
World Trade Center grounds). Accordingly, citizens with 
different political orientations did not vary in national 
attachment because national identity was positively valued 
on both sides of the ideological aisle in the USA. As the 
Bush Presidency carried on, however, attitudes toward the 
nation became not only more salient; Republicans increas-
ingly tried to make love of country a trait durably owned by 
the conservative/Republican camp (Tesler, 2010). In a 
speech during the 2008 campaign, Sarah Palin succinctly 
captured the more polarized politics that would be would 
characterize the Obama era—fights over what constitutes 
the “real America” (Davis, 2018). In this more polarized 
environment, with its debates over immigration, multicul-
turalism, and the continuing fight against the external threat 
of international terrorism (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; 
Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017), our expectation is that 
national identity remained a salient feature of US politics, 
and that the attempts of Republicans and conservatives 
were at least partially successful in owning the issue. In a 
comparative context, differences between political parties 
in the two European countries might be even larger. A large 
strand of research explores how the political competition in 
Western European countries is increasingly structured by a 
conflict over the implications of globalization. Whereas 
conservative actors stress the continuing importance of 
national attachments in times of weakening national bor-
ders, liberal actors tend to take a European and cosmopoli-
tan point of view (Kriesi et al., 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 
2009). Following this research, desirability of a strong 
national identity might not be consensual in the UK and 
Germany, but instead constitute a more accepted in-group 
norm in the conservative (right-wing) than the liberal (left-
wing) camp.
Uncritical loyalty and desire for positive change
In our view, Huddy and Khatib (2007) correctly point out 
that research should contrast national identity with norma-
tive dimensions of what it means to be a member of the 
nation. Again, we follow these authors and take account of 
two dimensions derived from Schatz et al. (1999), which 
describe “differences in the manner in which individuals 
relate to their country” (Schatz et al., 1999: 168). One is the 
degree to which people exhibit indiscriminate attitudes 
toward the righteousness of the conduct of this group. Citizens 
exhibiting such uncritical loyalty combine “unquestioning 
positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of 
criticism” (Schatz et al., 1999: 153). A second element of 
the research on the norms concerning the member-group 
relationship is the degree to which citizens are “driven by a 
desire for positive change” (Schatz et al., 1999: 153; see 
also Staub, 1997; Rothì et al., 2005). These norms are con-
stitutive elements of the “blind” and “constructive patriot-
ism” concepts introduced by Staub and colleagues (Schatz 
and Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997; Schatz et al., 1999), but 
since there is conceptual ambiguity (Huddy and Khatib, 
2007: 64) and since we do not have all the original items to 
measure these concepts, we use the more limited concepts 
of uncritical loyalty and desire for positive change.
How do these dimensions relate to political attitudes? 
Uncritical loyalty is not devoid of content. Huddy and 
Khatib (2007: 75) suggest that this dimension should be 
ideologically highly consequential. Following previous 
findings, it is straightforward to expect uncritical loyalty to 
be positively associated with a conservative ideology, iden-
tification with conservative parties and higher levels of 
right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Schatz et al., 1999; 
Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Parker, 2010). That is because 
these ideologies and groups all subscribe to notions of def-
erence to authority and the primacy of binding values over 
individualizing values (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2013).
As for the desire for positive change, one can argue 
along the lines of Huddy and Khatib (2007) that this dimen-
sion is devoid of content because it does not specify what 
constitutes positive change. Thus, ideologues and partisans 
likely disagree about what constitutes positive change, and 
the level of desire for positive change should be unrelated 
to political attitudes. Empirical findings support this expec-
tation—Schatz et al. (1999: 167) report that their construc-
tive patriotism measure, which includes questions about the 
desire for positive change, does not relate to self-identified 
ideology, party identity, and right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA). On the other hand, those who identify with a cer-
tain ideology or political party could internalize group 
norms about engagement for positive change (Huddy and 
Khatib, 2007: 64). It is difficult to specify the relationship 
between contemporary ideologies and the desire for posi-
tive change, but it seems reasonable to expect that this sen-
timent is less political than uncritical loyalty.
Empirical analysis
In the current study we analyze how national identity, 
uncritical loyalty, and desire for positive change correlate 
with fundamental political attitudes in the early 2010s in 
the USA, the UK, and Germany. We thus repeat the analy-
sis of Huddy and Khatib (2007) with data for the US public 
approximately 10–15 years later and also add data for two 
Western European countries. Extending the analysis to 
other countries, where “the nation” has a different meaning 
in political discourse, gives us a broader understanding of 
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the contours of national identity. As discussed above, given 
the nature of political discourse as a key contextual feature 
we suspect that there is an association between national 
identity and political attitudes in the 2010s both in the USA 
and in the Western European countries. We have not dis-
cussed uncritical loyalty and desire for positive change in a 
comparable manner, partly because we suspect the associa-
tions between these dimensions and political attitudes to be 
less dependent on context (and therefore more dependent 
on underlying values), but also for space considerations.
We proceed as follows. First, we test if this three-dimen-
sional conceptualization is empirically sound in each coun-
try by estimating separate latent variable models for 
nationally representative samples from each. Second, we 
assess the cross-cultural invariance in our ordered-categor-
ical measures. Third, we study the association of the three 
factors with political ideology and partisan preferences.
Methods
The national identity items we analyze come from the sec-
ond waves of original panel surveys conducted in the USA, 
the UK, and Germany. YouGov undertook data collection 
in May 2012 in the USA and the UK and in July 2015 in 
Germany. To achieve representative samples in these online 
surveys, selected respondents are matched on demographic 
factors (gender, age, education, and region), and we weight 
the final achieved samples to the characteristics of the US, 
UK, and German adult populations. The effective sample 
sizes (excluding cases with missing data across all national 
identity items) are 2330 (USA), 2339 (UK), and 2476 
(GER) (Table 1).
We hypothesize that the three latent dimensions generate 
observed survey responses to three survey questions apiece.3 
The identity items derive from Huddy and Khatib (2007). 
The items for uncritical loyalty and desire for positive 
change originate in the work of Schatz et al. (1999), 
where they are part of item batteries to measure blind and 
constructive patriotism, respectively. Respondents indicate 
their disagreement–agreement on a 5-point scale and, in one 
case (i1), on a 4-point scale. A latent RWA dimension gauges 
general value predispositions, with one 5-point scale item 
tapping each of the concepts’ three dimensions (i.e., submis-
sion, aggression, and conventionalism; Cronbach’s α = 
0.80 (USA), 0.79 (UK)).4 Furthermore, respondents report 
their party identity (e.g., “Generally speaking, do you con-
sider yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, 
or what?”) and their self-identified ideology using an 
11-point scale (1 = left, 11 = right). To account for non-
linear effects of ideology, two separate variables indicate the 
extremity of left- and right-wing ideology, respectively.
To analyze the dimensionality of the indicators, we esti-
mate exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) 
using the software package Mplus (Version 7.3). ESEM is 
both less restrictive and more transparent than confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), combining the strengths of both 
exploratory factor analysis and CFA (Marsh et al., 2014; for 
methodological details, see Online Appendix A2). As a 
robustness check, we estimate CFA analogous to the ESEM 
presented here. The CFA model fits are adequate as judged 
via approximate fit metrics and the substantive results 
mimic the ESEM results (see Appendices A3 and A4).
We first establish measurement reliability in our three 
countries, using country-specific ESEM before testing for 
configural and scalar invariance across countries using 
multiple group (MG) ESEM (Millsap and Yun-Tein, 2004).5 
Configural invariance requires only that “factor structures 
are equal across groups: The same configurations of salient 
and non-salient factor loadings should be found in all 
groups” (Davidov et al., 2014: 63), but the magnitude of the 
loadings may differ. In the case of scalar invariance, con-
straints force factor loadings and indicator thresholds to be 
equal across groups. Scalar invariance is necessary for 
making meaningful comparisons of latent variable correla-
tions and means across groups (Stegmueller, 2011: 473; 
Davidov et al., 2014: 64).
Table 1. Indicators of identity with the nation, uncritical loyalty, and desire for positive change.
(I) Identity with the nation, Cronbach’s α = 0.83 (USA), 0.85 (UK), 0.85 (GER)
i1 How well does the term [NATIONAL] describe you?
i2 How important is being [NATIONAL] to you?
i3 For me, to possess [NATIONAL] citizenship is… (Not important at all – Extremely important)
(UL) Uncritical loyalty, α = 72 (USA), 0.69 (UK), 0.72 (GER)
u1 I support [NATIONAL] policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.
u2 I believe [NATIONAL] policies are always the morally correct ones.
u3 In matters of international affairs, [NATIONAL] is virtually always right.
(DC) Desire for positive change, α = 0.79 (USA), 0.79 (UK), 0.72 (GER)
c1 People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.
c2 If one feels allegiance to one’s country, one should strive to mend its problems.
c3 I appreciate the [NATIONAL] political system very much, but I am willing to criticize it in 
order to achieve further improvement.
UL: uncritical loyalty; DC: desire for positive change; US: United States; UK: United Kingdom; GER: Germany.
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Results
The country-specific ESEM and the unconstrained 
MGESEM yields a close fit to the data (Table 2). This 
means that the same factorial structure exists in the USA, 
the UK, and Germany. The scalar invariant MGESEM also 
fits the data well, with the close fit indices at appropriate 
levels, below 0.05 for the case of the RMSEA and above 
0.95 for the CFI (Byrne, 2012). As Table 3 shows, all indi-
cators load substantively on their respective factor and 
there are no large cross-loadings. In sum, these results dem-
onstrate that full scalar invariance holds.
The regression models (Table 4) show that self-identi-
fied ideology and partisan affiliation substantially influ-
ence identity with the nation in all three countries.6 
Furthermore, right-wing authoritarianism has a substantial 
impact in the USA and the UK. These results resemble 
those for uncritical loyalty. The closer that citizens place 
themselves on the right endpoint of the ideological contin-
uum, the more identified with and uncritically loyal to the 
nation they are. Higher values of RWA are positively asso-
ciated with identity and uncritical loyalty. Finally, affiliates 
of the conservative parties score higher on these two dimen-
sions than citizens without partisan ties.
Interestingly, a similar pattern exists with regard to affil-
iates of the dominant left-of-center parties in the UK and 
Germany, respectively. German and UK citizens who iden-
tify with the Social Democratic Party and Labour Party 
score higher on national identity and uncritical loyalty than 
citizens without partisan ties do. This might indicate a 
cleavage between general system supporters and opponents 
which runs (to some extent) across ideological lines. Our 
findings from a later period differ from the results of Huddy 
and Khatib (2007); they show uncritical loyalty to be 
“politically powerful” and national identity to be “ideologi-
cally more neutral” during the 90s and early 2000s.7
We find the relationship between partisanship and ideol-
ogy and the desire for positive change to be more muted:
1. Although it does correlate positively with RWA, the 
association is substantially weaker than in the cases 
of identity and uncritical loyalty.
2. It correlates positively with self-identified right- as 
well as left-wing ideology.
3. Desire for positive change does not vary with parti-
san affiliation in the USA (it does in the UK and 
Germany).
Table 2. Fit indices of ESEM models with three factors.
Model χ2 df CFI RMSEA [90 % CIs]
ESEM United States 16.5 12 1.00 0.013 [0.000, 0.026]
ESEM United Kingdom 25.8 12 0.999 0.022 [0.010, 0.034]
ESEM Germany 29.4 12 0.999 0.024 [0.013, 0.035]
MGESEM configural 74.6 36 0.999 0.021 [0.014, 0.028]
MGESEM scalar 642.9 118 0.988 0.043 [0.040, 0.047]
ESEM: exploratory structural equation model; MGESEM: multigroup exploratory structural equation model; df: degrees of freedom; CFI: comparative 
fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CIs: confidence intervals.
Table 3. Unstandardized loadings of the scalar invariant model.
F1 F2 F3
(I) Identity  
How well does the term [NATIONAL] describe you? 5.72 −0.01 −0.01
How important is being [NATIONAL] to you? 1.28 0.05 0.09
For me, to possess [NATIONAL] citizenship is… (“Not important at all” to 
“Extremely important”)
1.71 0.07 0.15
(UL) Uncritical loyalty  
I support [NATIONAL] policies for the very reason that they are the policies 
of my country.
0.37 0.90 0.01
I believe [NATIONAL] policies are always the morally correct ones. 0.06 1.23 0.00
In matters of international affairs, [NATIONAL] is virtually always right. −0.00 2.07 −0.13
(DC) Desire for positive change  
People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction. 0.15 −0.02 1.43
If one feels allegiance to one’s country, one should strive to mend its problems. −0.01 −0.01 0.84
I appreciate the [NATIONAL] political system very much, but I am willing to 
criticize it in order to achieve further improvement.
−0.00 0.13 1.83
Note: See Table 2 for the global fit of the model.
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Table 4. Determinants of national identity, uncritical loyalty, and desire for positive change.
US UK GER
 I UL DC I UL DC I UL DC
RWA 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.14*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.15***  
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03 (0.03)  
Self-identified 
right wing
0.12*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.07 0.10** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.04 0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Self-identified 
left wing
−0.20*** −0.36*** 0.19*** −0.17*** −0.27*** 0.08* −0.14*** −0.12*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PI Republicans 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.00  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  
PI Democrats 0.04 0.21*** 0.01  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  
PI 
Conservatives
0.20*** 0.16*** 0.14**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  
PI Labour 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.11*  
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)  
PI Liberals 0.08* 0.08* 0.03  
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)  
PI SNP −0.09** −0.03 0.02  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  
PI Green Party 0.02 −0.04 0.01  
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
PI UKIP 0.10*** 0.02 0.10**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
PI BNP 0.08** −0.05* 0.04  
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  
PI CDU/CSU 0.19*** 0.37*** 0.15***
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
PI FDP 0.01 0.05 0.05
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PI SPD 0.08* 0.16*** 0.06
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
PI Greens −0.03 0.02 0.08*
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PI Left 0.03 0.01 0.00
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
PI AfD 0.13*** −0.03 0.13***
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black −0.01 0.06 0.04  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  
White 0.02 −0.05 0.07  
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  
Education low −0.05 0.11*** −0.10** 0.06* 0.17*** −0.03 0.03 −0.04 −0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education high −0.03 −0.10*** 0.05 −0.02 −0.05 0.05 −0.08** −0.08 0.10**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.35*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.11* 0.07* 0.09* 0.15**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female 0.05 0.10*** −0.03 0.10*** 0.09** −0.04 −0.05 0.04 −0.10***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.39 0.40 0.14 0.23 0.30 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.11
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Note: Reported are standardized linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; I, UL, and DC were specified as latent ESEM 
constructs; RWA indicators were only allowed to load on RWA construct; the reference category for the self-identified ideology variables is 
respondents at the scale midpoint; for the PI dummies, it is Independent/Other party/No preference (USA), Other party/No-one (UK), and Other 
party/No preference (GER); for the coding of the education categories, see the Online Appendix.
USA: χ2 (df = 126) = 1077.8, RMSEA = 0.057 [CI 90% 0.054, 0.060], CFI = 0.927.
UK: χ2 (df = 153) = 738.0, RMSEA = 0.040 [CI 90% 0.038, 0.043], CFI = 0.948.
GER: χ2 (df = 84) = 219.5, RMSEA = 0.031 [CI 90% 0.026, 0.036], CFI = 0.990.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
I: identity; UL: uncritical loyalty; DC: desire for positive change; PI: party identification; SNP: Scottish National Party; Green Party: of England and 
Wales; UKIP: UK Independence Party; BNP: British National Party; CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Unionspartei-
ein); FDP: Free Democratic Party; SPD: Social Democratic Party; Greens: The Green Party (Die Grünen); Left: The Left (Die Linke); AfD: Alterna-
tive for Germany; ESEM: exploratory structural equation models; RWA: right-wing authoritarianism; US: United States; UK: United Kingdom; GER: 
Germany; df: degrees of freedom; RMSEA: root mean square error of approximation; CI: confidence interval; CFI: comparative fit index.
Table 4. (Continued)
Discussion
This study addresses the question whether levels of national 
identity, uncritical loyalty, and a desire for change vary by 
political beliefs. The work of Huddy and Khatib (2007) 
with US data dating from the 1990s and early 2000s sug-
gests that identity is “ideologically neutral.”8 With fresh 
data from the 2010s, we find national identity to be associ-
ated with political attitudes both when we look at data from 
the same country they analyzed (the USA) and when study-
ing UK and German citizens. Specifically, identification 
with parties of the right and center-right as well as right-
wing ideology in the USA and Germany correlates with 
higher national identity scores. The opposite relationship 
holds for left-wing ideologues in the three nations.
To some extent the difference between our findings and 
Huddy and Khatib’s might be rooted in methodological dif-
ferences. As noted, we use slightly different items to cap-
ture core concepts, including national identity, political 
ideology, and authoritarianism. However, the differences 
here are not terribly large. Consequently, we see two pos-
sible choices when evaluating Huddy and Khatib:
The first possibility is that their results are extremely 
fragile to minor changes in question wording or modeling 
strategy. Given the robustness of their findings (demon-
strated in the supplemental material), we do not think this 
interpretation is convincing.
The second possibility is that their broad theoretical 
approach is correct, but the specific findings are bound in 
time and space.
We greatly prefer this second interpretation. The social 
identity approach stresses that the construction of identities 
is a dynamic process—accordingly, whether and how polit-
ical actors might emphasize national identity as integral 
part of their political group may change over time. 
Following this line of reasoning, our findings suggest that 
national identity in the USA became “owned” by the politi-
cal right. In the UK and Germany, the pattern of right-wing 
citizens identifying more strongly with the nation than citi-
zens on the left corresponds to the greater significance that 
conservative ideologies attribute to the nation in these 
countries (e.g., Lochocki, 2016; Ford and Goodwin, 2017).
Another interesting finding from the multi-variate anal-
yses is that adherents to all the mainstream parties of the 
left (Labour, Social Democratic Party (GER), Democrats) 
and right (Conservatives, Christian Democratic Union/
Christian Social Union, Republicans) in the three coun-
tries show higher levels of uncritical loyalty than do non-
partisans. On the one hand, this result could simply signal 
that more politically engaged citizens buy into the notion 
that their nation is generally just and a force for good in 
the world. This account would not be a cause for concern 
as a certain degree of trust and diffuse support of the 
national political system aids its survival and basic func-
tioning. On the other hand, recent work shows partisans’ 
susceptibility to indiscriminately accepting arguments 
that accord with their predispositions (Taber and Lodge, 
2006). Lilliana Mason’s powerful account of partisan 
division in America should be cause for alarm (Mason, 
2018). When representatives of political parties make 
statements about the national goals or values, can parti-
sans with high levels of uncritical loyalty push back, par-
ticularly if statements are false and/or unethical (e.g., 
Flynn et al., 2017)?
We agree with Huddy and Khatib (2007) and others 
about the need for situating research on how citizens think 
and feel about their nation more firmly in the analytical 
framework of the social identity approach. In this spirit we 
have drawn on that approach to argue that a high level of 
national identity—a strong sense of belonging to the 
nation—may or may not be an in-group norm of political 
groups. The politicization of national identity may change 
over time. By implication, to derive expectations about pat-
terns of national identity and political attitudes at a given 
place and time, we should look at the particular dynamics 
of the political discourse at that place and time. It is, for 
example, not at all clear what to expect in terms of the pat-
tern of national identity and partisan views if we were to 
repeat the analysis with US public opinion data collected 
during the Trump presidency. Has the further increase in 
ideological polarization since the Obama period and 
President Trump’s credo of “Make America Great Again” 
and “America first!” strengthened the hold of conservatives 
and Republicans on national identity? Similarly, how have 
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these rhetorical devices affected Democrats’ identities as 
Americans? Have the widespread debates about alternative 
visions of American identity—markedly different in con-
tent but equal in their feelings for the nation—led back to a 
more equal distribution of national attachment between the 
political camps? Moreover, how is the relationship between 
identity and ideology and/or partisanship changing in the 
wake of Brexit in the UK and heightened debate over refu-
gees in Germany? Aside from this, future research may aim 
at more fine-grained measures of potentially relevant con-
textual features to tease out specific effects. We hope future 
work will answer these and other questions to better under-
stand the consequences of the over-time and cross-national 
variation in citizens’ national identity in general and the 
implications of the (current) politicization of belonging to 
the nation specifically.
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Notes
1. There is wide diversion in the literature on the meaning 
behind the term “identity.” As we extend the research of 
Huddy and Khatib (2007), we follow them in using the term 
“national identity” to indicate the citizen’s “sense of belong-
ing” with their nation.
2. Huddy and Khatib (2007: 65) make the same argument 
when they point out that “individuals with a strong group 
identity are most likely to conform to group norms.” 
Accordingly, they argue that “voting thus constitutes a 
prescriptive, normative component of American identity.” 
We extend this reasoning and consider the possibility that 
feelings of national attachment might themselves be a pre-
scriptive, normative component of ideological or partisan 
attachments.
3. We document the exact question wording of the items from 
all three surveys in Online Appendix A1.
4. RWA appears in the first waves of the panel surveys in the 
USA and the UK; it is absent from the German survey.
5. Results of country-specific models are presented in Online 
Appendix A2.
6. We follow Huddy and Khatib (2007) here in treating the 
national identity dimensions as outcomes of political orien-
tations. The causal relations are likely more complex. It is 
not our aim here to disentangle them but to contribute to the 
question of whether certain identity dimensions should be 
seen as politically neutral, or “non-ideological.”
7. Differences in measurement instruments and coding might 
partially explain why our findings deviate from Huddy and 
Khatib (2007) for national identity. However, in sections 
A5 and A6 of the Online Appendix we report additional 
analyses, showing that these methodological differences are 
unlikely to fully account for these deviations.
8. We affirm the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) by a 
near-replication of their analysis of the 1996 General Social 
Survey (GSS, 1996). Results appear in Table A6-1.
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